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resumen
El artículo tiene como objetivo reflexionar sobre el ‘humanismo’ y presentar propuestas humani-
stas desde una perspectiva post-colonial. Comienza por examinar los supuestos que subyacen en la 
ciencia moderna e ilustrada para poner al descubierto su complicidad en la práctica colonial. A continu-
ación, se analiza el humanismo para mostrar cómo se ha utilizado una noción altamente politizada del 
humanismo para justificar las prácticas y estructuras deshumanizantes del colonialismo. Este ejercicio 
crítico se complementa con la discusión de dos propuestas humanistas que tratan de presentar un hu-
manismo alternativo que tiene como objetivo posibilitar una comunicación y entendimiento inclusivo, 
humanista y transcultural en un mundo que se hace cada vez más interrelacionado.
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abstract
The article aims to reconsider ‘humanism’ and to present humanistic proposals from a post-coloni-
al perspective. It begins by examining the assumptions underlying the modern and enlightened science 
to expose its complicity in the colonial enterprise. It then analyses humanism to show how a highly 
politicised notion of humanism has been deployed to justify the dehumanising practices and structures 
of colonialism. This critical exercise is complemented by the discussion of two humanistic proposals 
that seek to present an alternative humanism that is geared to enabling an inclusive and humanistic 
trans-cultural communication and understanding in an increasingly interrelated world.
Keywords: Enlightenment, Colonialism, Humanism, Post-colonial Studies, Science.
introduction: Enlightenment, science and Colonialism 
The multiple and complex realities of  globalisation, cross-cultural encounters 
and conflicts as well as the new and renewed critical methodologies have highlight-
ed the inadequacy of  the grand narratives of  European Enlightenment scientific 
and social paradigms to account for the complexity and plurality of  the social and 
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cultural realities of  our present-day world. It has become clear, therefore, that the 
traditional modes of  doing and thinking knowledge, scientific or otherwise, and the 
underlying conception of  science need to be critically revised and transformed. This 
critical revision also underscores the need for new epistemologies and methodolo-
gies that could provide grounds for an inclusive and humanistic trans-cultural com-
munication and understanding in an increasingly globalised and interrelated world. 
It is commonly assumed that the European colonialism, which began in the late 
fifteenth century, owed at least some of  its manifestations to the violent and expan-
sionist energies of  European nationalism or the scramble for raw materials overseas. 
As Edward Said (1978) has argued, what underpinned the colonial enterprise and 
Europe1’s will to power however was the idea that European identity was superior to 
all the non-European peoples and cultures. This idea, which was nurtured and sup-
ported by an array of  supposedly scientific systems of  natural and social knowledge, 
seems to be, as Said suggests, «the major component in European culture [that] is 
precisely what made that culture hegemonic both in and outside Europe» (1978: 7). 
To understand the cultural and institutional authority of  science and its place 
within the ideologies and instrumentalities of  the colonial enterprise, we perhaps 
need to go back in history, precisely to the Age of  Enlightenment (Age of  Reason) 
of  the eighteenth century, and the metanarratives to which it gave rise. From this 
historical perspective, one can see that a founding ideal of  the enlightened project 
was the strong belief  in a modern scientific rationalism capable of  changing the 
world for good and improving the human existence in almost all its dimensions. 
In this culturally specific worldview, modern science was projected as a universal, 
value-free system or knowledge, which by the logic of  its method claimed to explain 
events by universal causal laws based on experimental testing to arrive at objective 
conclusions about life, the universe and almost everything (Shiva, 1993: 22). Prac-
ticing scientists and researchers were also thought to be free from the constraints 
of  the conceptual boundaries of  their intellectual disciplines and from the worldly 
and political concerns of  their times. Furthermore, the distinction between scientific 
and practical knowledge gave rise to the idea that scientific knowledge was universal, 
explanatory, demonstrated to be true by a standard method, teachable and learn-
able. Consequently, science has to be detached from practical life or the life-world 
(Hadorn and others, 2008: 20).
From a historical perspective, with the rise of  the liberal market economy in the 
nineteenth century, the instrumental interest in scientific knowledge from econom-
ics and society became an external driving force for the investment of  resources in 
1  It is to be noted that I understand ‘Europe’, ‘West’, ‘Non-West’ and ‘Orient’ as highly complex and heterogeneous 
entities that do not lend themselves easily to simple generalisations. I will therefore be using these terms loosely 
and in non-essentialist terms to indicate what is commonly perceived as spaces defined along certain historical, 
geopolitical and cultural lines.
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the progress of  modern science and its experimental, quantitative and mathematical 
perfection. The purpose of  improving the standard of  living by improved quality, 
and increasing quantities of  goods has been uncontested in society for a long time. 
As a result, many have come to see scientific activity as free from extra-scientific 
societal values (Hadorn and others, 2008: 21). 
Post-colonial historians and critics have nonetheless shown that, far from its 
self-declared political disinterestedness and putative objectivity and neutrality, 
modern science is a significantly social activity that reflects as much as informs 
the values, practices and the worldly interests of  the society in which it is pro-
duced. This way, modern science is shown as a social practice that is embedded 
in economic activities, cultural orientations and political measures that shape and 
legitimatise its conception and role in society. Science thus reveals itself  as much 
more culturally specific as it was once assumed to be (Stepan, 1991: 10), and as 
an intellectual field, with interests, conflicts and hierarchies analogous to other 
cultural fields (Bourdieu, 1975). Post-colonial critics of  science and colonialism 
have also emphasised not only the ideological and cultural embeddedness of  West-
ern scientific knowledge, but also its constitutive role in colonialism (Seth, 2009: 
374-5), in the sense that it functioned not merely as a ‘tool’ for a project already 
underway, but as a means of  conceptualising and bringing into being the colonial 
enterprise itself. Londa Schiebinger (2005: 52) has even argued that it has become 
clear that the history of  almost all modern science must be understood as «science 
in a colonial context».
Within this broad context of  interrogating the mutually constitutive relation-
ship between modern science and colonialism, post-colonial critics also centre 
their critique on the genesis and evolution of  the Western modern project itself. 
Aníbal Quijano (2007: 171) has argued that during the same period as Euro-
pean colonial domination was consolidating itself, the cultural complex known 
as Euro pean modernity/rationality was being constituted. Moreover, since there 
is no modernity without coloniality (Escobar, 2007: 184), there is a need to rec-
ognise that Europe’s acquisition of  the adjective ‘modern’ for itself  is a piece 
of  global history of  which an integral part is the story of  European imperialism 
(Chakrabarty, 1992: 352). 
The post-colonial critique has thus showed that the scientific and pseudoscien-
tific knowledge systems and socio-political institutions, which emerged in the wake 
of  the Enlightenment, have been one of  the instruments that enabled Western pow-
ers to secure economic gains, political control and cultural hegemony in the non-
West. As outlined above, modern science was not only a tool for the colonial en-
terprise, but was constitutive of  the discourse and practice of  colonialism, which in 
turn was the offspring of  the modern project itself. As Iskandar and Rustom (2010: 
417-418) have argued, the ideas, ideals, institutions, and practices that have shaped 
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modern Western society (and reverberated to the non-West thanks to imperialism) 
have come into being by virtue of  an unacknowledged, and often disastrous, synthe-
sis of  idealism and empiricism, understood as modes of  intellection and (by exten-
sion) philosophical/cultural traditions.
The trained physicist and environmental activist, Vandana Shiva (1993: 22), ar-
gues that the dominant stream of  modern science is a specific projection of  Western 
‘man’ that originated during the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries as the much-
acclaimed Scientific Revolution. She characterises this special epistemological tradi-
tion as ‘reductionist’ because «it reduced the capacity of  humans to know nature 
both by excluding other knowers and other ways of  knowing», and «by manipulating 
it (sic) as inert and fragmented matter, nature’s capacity for creative regeneration and 
renewal was reduced» (1993: 23). The multidimensional ecological crisis all over the 
world, in her view, is an eloquent testimony to the havoc wrought by the modern 
reductionist science.
Shiva (1988) also argues that this quintessentially reductionist science also perpe-
trates what she calls ‘epistemological violence’, manifest in its suppression and dis-
missal of  local knowledge and experiences in favour of  a totalitarian and reduction-
ist science that presents itself  as the only legitimate mode of  knowing. This violence 
is inflicted on the subject socially through the sharp divide between the expert and 
the non-expert, a divide that converts the vast majority of  non-experts into non-
knowers even in those areas of  life in which the responsibility of  practice and action 
rests with them. The putative object of  knowledge is violated when modern science, 
in a mindless effort to transform nature without a thought for the consequences, 
destroys the innate integrity and regenerative capacity of  nature. Contrary to the 
claim of  modern science that people are ultimately the beneficiaries of  scientific 
knowledge, Shiva argues, people –particularly the poor– are its worst victims; they 
are deprived of  their life-support systems in the reckless pillage of  nature. Seen 
through Foucault’s hypothesis about dominant knowledge systems, modern science 
can be said to function, «as a double repression: in terms of  those whom it excludes 
from the process and in terms of  the model and the standard (the bars) it imposes 
on those receiving this knowledge» (Foucault, 1977: 219).
With an understanding of  discourses as heavily policed cognitive systems 
which control and delimit both the mode and the means of  representation in a 
given society (Gandhi, 1998: 77), the post-colonial critique interrogates the Euro-
pean scientific knowledge as a grand narrative through which Eurocentric world-
view has been ‘totalised’ as the hegemonic and proper mode of  knowing for all 
humanity. Accordingly, as will be discussed in detail later, the aim of  post-colonial 
critique is to deconstruct and question this totalising account with the voices of  
all those unaccounted for ‘others’ who have been silenced and domesticated under 
the sign of  Europe. 
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The discussion on the notion of  ‘race’ (and the concomitant racist ideolo-
gies), and how it has been ‘invented’ by various natural and social sciences over 
many centuries is an illustrating example of  the way in which purportedly scientific 
knowledge associated with modern science provides socio-cognitive bases and ra-
tionalisation for certain beliefs and modes of  conduct. Teun A. van Dijk (2005: 
7) argues that racist philosophies and sciences (sometimes conveniently called 
‘pseudo- sciences’ today, but quite respectable in their own times), developed es-
pecially in the nineteenth century, and we can still find remnants of  such ideas 
in psychology and social science until today. He further points out that racism is 
unthinkable without this socio-cognitive basis of  racist beliefs and ideologies of  
which a classical proposition was the alleged superiority of  white Europeans in a 
global colour or ‘race’ hierarchy in which they invariably came out on top, black 
Africans at the bottom, and ‘yellow’ Asians in the middle (van Dijk, 2005: 7-8). In 
this ideological worldview, ‘scientifically’ legitimated imaginary differences between 
‘races’ have thus been used to enslave, exploit, discriminate and dominate other 
peoples for centuries. 
In short, as part of  their on-going decolonising endeavours, post-colonial critics 
have forcefully called into question the vision of  modern science as a positive and 
value-free activity that merely coincided with colonialism and had no role in ration-
alising and legitimising the colonial racist, discriminatory and inhumane practices. 
The post-colonial emphasis laid on revealing the extra-scientific societal values that 
inform modern science and its cultural and ideological embeddedness as well as 
the interested uses and abuses of  scientific knowledge does not necessarily mean 
an anti-science stance. Rather, it is an attempt to examine critically modern science 
and the consequences of  its applications in the life world of  those ‘others’ that have 
been silenced and marginalised by its totalising and hegemonic power. This critical 
exercise implies, firstly, the need to demystify the claims about the self-declared po-
litical disinterestedness and putative objectivity and neutrality of  modern science, to 
show that it is essentially a social activity that reflects as much as informs the values, 
practices and the worldly interests of  the society in which it is produced. Secondly, 
it also entails the foregrounding of  other conceptual alternatives and epistemologies 
that account for and celebrate the interconnectedness of  our increasingly globalised 
world as a basis for a genuinely humanistic trans-cultural communication and un-
derstanding. 
reconsidering Humanism: a post-colonial approach 
Against the backdrop of  the preceding discussion of  the relations between En-
lightenment, science and colonialism, I shall now present an introduction to Post-
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colonial Studies and its approach to humanism. As an important subfield of  literary 
and cultural studies, which crystallised in the 1980s, Post-colonial Studies focuses 
particularly on investigating the intimate relationship between culture and politics, 
highlighting the interrelations between certain cultural forms and particular po-
litical and historical practices (Omar, 2008: 228). Departing from the assumption 
that Western power has always been as a symptom of  the hegemony of  Western 
epistemology and pedagogy (Gandhi, 1998: 54), Post-colonial Studies represents a 
scholarly and critical engagement with the systems of  Western knowledge and the 
ideological interests that inhabit their production and reception. The prefix ‘post’ in 
the post-colonial, as Jean-Francois Lyotard (1992) suggests, indicates the conviction 
«that it is both possible and necessary to break with tradition and institute absolutely 
new ways of  living and thinking» (1992: 90). Post-colonial Studies thus directs its 
critique against the cultural hegemony of  European knowledges in an attempt to 
reassert the epistemological value of  the non-European world (Gandhi, 1998: 44) 
and the wide range of  illegitimate, disqualified or ‘subjugated knowledges’ (Foucault, 
1980: 82) of  the ‘decolonised’ peoples, which have been denigrated and silenced by 
colonial canonical systems.
A prime example of  the post-colonial critique is Edward Said’s Orientalism of  
1978, which is commonly regarded as the principal catalyst and reference point for 
Post-colonial Theory (Gandhi, 1998: 23). Employing the insights of  French post-
structuralism, in particular those of  Foucault, Said sets out to analyse a range of  
nineteenth-century European representations of  oriental cultures, and to highlight 
the forms of  language and knowledge that were intimately connected to, and col-
luded with, the history of  European colonialism. Taking the late eighteenth century 
as a roughly defined starting point, Said argues that Orientalism (Occidental re-
presentations of  the Orient) can be discussed and analysed as the corporate insti-
tution for dealing with the Orient by making statements about it, describing and 
authorising views of  it, by teaching it and ruling over it. In short, Orientalism is «a 
Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient» 
(Said, 1978: 3). For Said, therefore, Orientalism was not only an academic study of  
‘the Orient’, but a discourse, which through the complicity of  knowledge systems 
with political power, not only constructed but also was instrumental in administering 
and subjugating ‘the Orient.’ In other words, Orientalism was a form of  epistemic 
or cultural violence in line with peace research terminology. The peace theorist, Jo-
han Galtung (1990: 291), defines ‘cultural violence’ as “those aspects of  culture, the 
symbolic sphere of  our existence […] that can be used to justify or legitimise direct 
or structural violence”. 
In sum, Post-colonial Studies is the generic name for a cross-disciplinary dis-
tinct set of  conceptual frameworks and reading strategies that seek to engage with 
all cultural forms that mediate, resist and reflect upon the relations of  domination 
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between and within nations and cultures that, while being rooted in the history of  
modern European colonialism, continue to operate in the post-colonial era. 
In the context of  this brief  introduction, I shall now reconsider critically the 
concept of  ‘humanism’ from a post-colonial perspective. There is no denying the 
fact that ‘humanism’ is a highly contentious term. However, as Leela Gandhi (1998: 
27) points out, the various humanisms are unified in their belief  that underlying the 
diversity of  human experience it is possible, first, to discern a universal and given 
human nature, and secondly to find it revealed in the common language of  rational-
ity. Philip Bell (2010: 75) indicates that, in common parlance, ‘humanism’ refers to 
a range of  overlapping views centred on the belief  that human beings have value 
in themselves, and are not part of  any divine plan. This, in that view, is the source 
of  all civic values and rights. In this sense, science and reason are assumed to be 
capable of  providing comprehensive explanations of  the universe and human life 
itself. Admitting, however, that humanist values and ethical principles depend on a 
universalistic (or at least generalised) notion of  the species called ‘human’, he points 
out that humanism is a contingent episteme or paradigm that is linked to actual 
techno-cultural conditions, and hence it represents «a historically grounded ideology 
or world-view» (Bell, 2010: 74). 
Against this backdrop, Leela Gandhi (1998: 28-29) maintains that some criti-
cal methodologies associate humanism with the theory of  subjectivity and knowl-
edge philosophically inaugurated by Bacon, Descartes and Locke, and scientifically 
substantiated by Galileo and Newton. This philosophical and scientific revolution 
found its proper fulfilment in the eighteenth century, where it came to be embraced 
as the Enlightenment, or Aufklärung, defined by Immanuel Kant as «the possibil-
ity whereby man philosophically acquires the status and capacities of  a rational and 
adult being» (cited in Leela Gandhi, 1998: 30; emphasis added).
However, many thinkers have critically revised this enlightened notion of  ration-
ality and humanity. Michel Foucault (1984), for instance, argued that the very project 
of  Enlightenment rationality “did not make us mature adults” and hence it is far 
from conclusive (1984: 49). Projected as a reflection of  the heterogeneity of  human 
nature, the Enlightenment rationally in fact restricts the universal structures of  hu-
man existence to the normative condition of  adult rationality—itself  a value arising 
from the specific historicity of  European societies. It follows that this account of  
‘humanity’ precludes the possibility of  dialogue with other ways of  being human 
and, in fact, brings into existence and circulation the notion of  the ‘non-adult’ as 
‘inhuman’. This move also instantiates and sets into motion a characteristically peda-
gogic and imperialist hierarchy between European adulthood and its childish, colo-
nised ‘Other’ (Gandhi, 1998: 31-32).
It is in this context that G.W.F. Hegel (1991: 91), for example, described Africa as 
«the gold-land compressed within itself—the land of  childhood, which lying beyond 
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the day of  self-conscious history, is enveloped in the dark mantle of  Night». Point-
ing out that Africa has no place in ‘human’ history, which in Hegel’s mind meant 
the European history, he further affirms that, «For [Africa] is no historical part of  
the world; it has no movement or development to exhibit» (Hegel, 1991: 92). This 
perception of  the colonised culture as fundamentally childlike or childish clearly 
feeds into the logic of  the colonial ‘civilising mission’ which is fashioned, quite self-
consciously, as a form of  tutelage or a disinterested project concerned with bringing 
the colonised to maturity.
An illustrating example that demonstrates the operation and ambivalences of  
the mission civilisatrice (civilising mission) is the French colonial experience in Alge-
ria. The universal human rights enshrined in the Declaration of  the Rights of  Man and 
of  the Citizen, adopted by the Constituent Assembly in June 1789, are considered 
the founding pillars of  the modern French state. However, French universal rights 
found their severest test during the French occupation of  Algeria, which began in 
1830, where many atrocities were committed in the name of  humanism and univer-
salism. The French colonial experience in Algeria showed that the ideals of  universal 
humanism, liberty, equality and fraternity only represented a narrow chauvinistic 
dogma and a mere ideological cover for colonialism and enslavement. Robert Young 
(1992) points out, in this context, that the formation of  the ideas of  human na-
ture, humanity and the universal qualities of  the human mind coincided with those 
particularly violent centuries in the history of  the world now known as the era of  
Western colonialism. This, in his view, demonstrates humanism’s involvement in the 
history of  colonialism, and the fact that the two are not so easily separable. It was 
the recognition of  this use of  the ‘human’ as a highly politicised category, according 
to Young, that led to sustained critiques of  this type of  ‘humanism’ by a broad range 
of  post-war thinkers including mostly non-European writers such as Frantz Fanon, 
as will be discussed later. 
As Young (1990) stresses elsewhere, this criticism of  humanism does not imply 
that it is less philanthropic or lacking in ethics. Rather, it is a critical interrogation of  
the use of  the human as an explanatory category that claims to provide a rational 
understanding of  ‘man’—“an assumed universal predicated on the exclusion and mar-
ginalisation of  his Others, such as ‘woman’ or ‘the native’” (1990: 122). What these 
critiques have practically shown is that the category of  ‘human’ was too often invoked 
only in order to put the male before the female or to classify other ‘races’ as subhuman, 
and therefore not subject to the ethical prescriptions applicable to humanity at large. In 
his preface to Frantz Fanon’s book, The Wretched of  the Earth, Jean-Paul Sartre spells out 
the implications of  this statement, when he declares forcefully that: 
Liberty, equality, fraternity, love, honour, patriotism and what have you. All 
this did not prevent us from making anti-racial speeches about dirty niggers, 
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dirty Jews and dirty Arabs. High-minded people, liberal or just soft-hearted, 
protest that they were shocked by such inconsistency; but they were neither 
mistaken or dishonest, for with us there is nothing more consistent than a 
racist humanism since the European has only been able to become a man 
through creating slaves and monsters (Sartre in Fanon, 1963: 22).
As part of  its critique of  Western hegemonic systems of  knowledge, the ap-
proach of  Post-colonial Studies to humanism therefore lies in unmasking what it 
considers to be the unstated presuppositions of  the humanist tradition itself  in or-
der to bring to light its underlying ideological assumptions, and thus to reveal hu-
manism’s involvement in the history of  colonialism. This way, it poblematises and 
calls into question the taken-for-granted concepts and notions, such as humanism, 
in light of  the many forms of  epistemological violence and otherwise with which 
they have been historically associated. Nonetheless, the post-colonial ‘anti-humanist 
critique’, as it were, tries to go beyond the mere act of  problematization, and seeks to 
transform Western epistemological legacies to develop alternative modes of  knowl-
edge and a genuinely humanistic and inclusive notion of  humanism.
This critical and transformative enterprise is based on the recognition that one 
cannot simply dismiss modern Western sciences and systems of  knowledge as colo-
nialist and irrelevant, because there are neither originary spaces outside the discursive 
universe delimited by the Western modern project nor privileged and uncolonised 
terrains from which to speak, including Post-colonial Theory itself  (Venn, 2002: 
51). As Ashis Nandy (1983) argues, colonialism has particularly helped to generalise 
the concept of  the modern West from a geographical and temporal entity to a psy-
chological category. In his view, «the West is now everywhere, within the West and 
outside, in structures and in minds» (1983: xi). 
In the context of  this overlapping of  histories, geographies and systems of  knowl-
edge, I contend that any critique of  Western modernity or the scientific knowledge 
associated with it should in no way mean a regression to cultural particularism or 
ethnocentrism. It can neither avoid dealing with the historical legacy and epistemo-
logical dominance of  Western systems of  knowledge, and the forms of  epistemic 
and cultural violence that they may generate. However, it should assume the respon-
sibility of  subjecting these hegemonic modes of  knowledge to critique and trying 
to radically transform them by integrating them with other forms of  knowledge to 
enable the flourishing of  a plurality of  life-enhancing and non-coercive modes of  
knowledge in the interests of  human freedom. As Young (1992: 250) points out, the 
legacy of  colonialism is as much a problem for the West as it is for the scarred lands 
in the world beyond.
Dipesh Chakrabarty (2000: 16) argues that the “European thought is at once 
both indispensable and inadequate in helping us to think through the experiences 
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of  political modernity in non-Western nations”. Recognising that this thought is 
now a common heritage that affects us all, Chakrabarty maintains that the task of  
the post-colonial critic lies in investigating how this thought could be transformed 
and renewed from and for the margins. This position echoes the call made by Aníbal 
Quijano (2007: 177) who called for ‘an epistemological decolonisation’ to clear the 
way for a new intercultural communication and an interchange of  experiences and 
meanings as the basis of  another rationality which may legitimately aspire to some 
universality. Indeed, the notion of  epistemological pluralism lies at the heart of  the 
post-colonial task to restore other forms of  knowledge, which have been dismissed 
as deviations from a European standard, and to develop alternative modes of  knowl-
edge and methodologies that could provide grounds for a genuinely inclusive and 
humanistic trans-cultural communication and understanding. It is in this context 
that I shall now present the humanistic proposals made by two major anticolonial 
and post-colonial critics, Frantz Fanon and Edward W. Said, respectively. 
Frantz Fanon and the new Humanism
Frantz Fanon (1925-1961), the Martinican psychiatrist who became a militant 
in the Algerian revolution, is often known as an advocate of  anti-colonial violence 
as exemplified in his much cited book, Les damnés de la terre (The Wretched of  the 
Earth, 1963), which became an inspiration for the anti-colonial movement that 
swept the colonial world in the 1960s (Omar, 2009: 264). Less known of  his writ-
ings, nonetheless, is his vision of  a ‘new humanism’ that reflects his reconciliatory 
endeavour to envision an all-inclusive humanism that would go beyond the confines 
of  the colonial conflictive situation. 
Overall, Fanon’s writings point to his constant longing to overcome the inhu-
mane and disabling socio-political structures of  the colonial situation and their 
ideological underpinnings. His desire to go beyond this situation by way of  en-
visaging a more promising future of  equitable human relations based on mutual 
recognition is what Fanon encapsulates in his notion of  the need to create ‘new 
men’. In his writing in general and particularly in his earlier works, Fanon shows 
that he was seeking to investigate colonialism in terms of  its human impact, or 
more precisely the distortion of  human relations that it engendered. In his first 
work, and precisely in the last chapter of  Peau noire, masques blancs (Black Skin, 
White Masks), Fanon (1952) makes clear his humanist message and indicates the 
way out of  the spiral of  Manichean violence of  the racist and colonial systems. As 
he puts it, only when both Whites and Blacks, colonisers and colonised, turn their 
backs on the inhuman voices of  their respective ancestors, a birth of  an authentic 
human communication becomes possible:
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It is through the effort to recapture the self  and to scrutinise the self, it is 
through the lasting tension of  their freedom that men will be able to create 
the ideal conditions of  existence for a human world. Superiority? Inferiority? 
Why not the quite simple attempt to touch the other, to feel the other, to ex-
plain the other to yourself ? (Fanon, 1967: 231).
Convinced that every struggle for human liberation was always a struggle for 
a liberated identity, Fanon believed in the need for decolonising action that would 
effectively liberate both the colonised and the coloniser from the Manichean world 
in which they were trapped. It was in this sense that for him liberation meant more 
than just political independence; perhaps more importantly, it symbolised the regen-
eration of  individuals and of  society. As Irene Gendzier (1973: xi) has noted, for 
Fanon liberation meant «…the travail of  people undoing the effects of  colonisation 
and restructuring their relations with one another and with the former colonising 
power on the basis of  their new situation». It was also Fanon’s understanding that 
racial and colonial oppression denied the dominated people even the notion of  hu-
manity that vigorously led him, precisely in the conclusion of  The Wretched of  the 
Earth, to set out to chart a new path that would transform the colonised—and the 
colonisers, for that matter—and bring them back their humanity. 
If  the evidence of  the success of  a struggle lies in an entire social structure being 
radically changed, Fanon argues, the ultimate goal of  this arduous transformation is 
to «set a foot a new man» (Fanon, 1963: 316)—which is taken here to mean new and 
transformed men and women.2 The creation of  a new language and a new human-
ity is thus for Fanon the central thrust of  any genuine struggle for human freedom.
Fanon argues that there can be no liberation of  consciousness separate from 
the total struggle for social liberation. This means that no radical transformation 
of  identity was possible without an entire struggle to radically transform the social 
order—encompassing both the coloniser and the colonised—and create new human 
and humanising relations. As Fanon says, 
The struggle for freedom does not give back to the national culture its former 
value and shapes; this struggle which aims at a fundamentally different set of  
relations between men cannot leave intact either the form or the content of  
the people’s culture. After the conflict, there is not only the disappearance of  
colonialism but also the disappearance of  the colonised man. This new human-
ity cannot do otherwise than define a new humanism both for itself  and for 
others (Fanon, 1963: 245-6; emphases added). 
2  This interpretation notwithstanding, I am also aware of  the criticisms that have been levelled against Fanon for 
his use of  a ‘gender-blind’ language.
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Fanon’s humanist vision thus stems from his conviction and understanding of  
humanity as one indivisible whole. That is why he stresses the need for reconsider-
ing the common human condition and for inventing new plans for a humanity that 
Europe has proved «incapable of  bring to a triumphant birth» (Fanon, 1963: 313). 
An indispensable task to undertake in this context is to rethink the very notion of  
humanism, in the name of  which many crimes were perpetrated against humanity 
itself. In his case, Fanon sets out to read the history of  European colonialism against 
the backdrop of  this ethnocentric humanism, which he finds indefensible, leading 
him in the conclusion of  his abovementioned book to urge his readers to: 
Leave this Europe where they are never done talking of  Man, yet murder men 
everywhere they find them, at the corner of  every one of  their own streets, in 
all the corners of  the globe. For centuries they have stifled almost the whole 
of  humanity in the name of  a so-called spiritual experience (Fanon, 1963: 
312).
Fanon’s relentless attack on the cruel nature of  European humanism, howev-
er, should not be read as an attempt to dispose of  humanism per se, but rather to 
bring into existence a new and true humanism. As Robert Young (1992) points out, 
Fanon’s criticism of  Europe does not stop at the violent history of  colonial appro-
priation. For the effect of  colonialism, as he suggests, is to dehumanise the native, a 
process which, paradoxically, finds its justification in the values of  Western human-
ism. Fanon’s humanist project lies thus in rethinking the very notion of  humanism 
itself  in order to lay bare and overcome its ethnocentric assumptions, and to envis-
age a new inclusive notion of  humanity. He writes stressing that, «let us reconsider 
the question of  mankind…whose connections must be increased, whose channels 
must be diversified and whose messages must be re-humanised» (Fanon, 1963: 314). 
In line with this indispensable reconsideration of  humanism, Fanon clearly points 
out that the new history of  humanity ought to be a history «which will have regard to 
the sometimes prodigious theses which Europe has put forward, but which will also 
not forget Europe’s crimes, of  which the most horrible was committed in the heart 
of  man» (Fanon, 1963: 315). Paul Gilory (2010: 36) observes that Fanon’s human-
ism represents a post-anthropological, postcolonial and post-exotic humanism that 
distinguished itself  from the contending liberal and Cold War varieties of  that creed 
by being self-consciously articulated as an acknowledgement of  racism’s debasement 
of  humanity. 
In a similar vein, Fanon strongly cautions his fellows from the Third World na-
tions that they should not waste time imitating Europe, and be obsessed with the de-
sire to catch up with it. Instead, their aim must be to seek to unite all human energies 
in one communion whose goal is to achieve human common progress. For this to 
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happen, he stresses that the human caravan should not be stretched out, «for in that 
case each line will hardly see those who precede it; and men who no longer recognise 
each other meet less and less together, and talk to each other less and less» (Fanon, 
1963: 315; emphasis added). 
Of  course, in advancing his humanistic project, Fanon was aware of  the gap 
between the realm of  the desirable and that of  the actual, to put it another way. 
His humanist appeal however is a direct call to individuals and groups to transform 
themselves in an effort to remake the world. Thus, Fanon conclusively leaves us all 
with a moral imperative that «we must turn over a new leaf;3 we must work out new 
concepts, and try to set afoot a new man» (Fanon, 1963: 316). For him, it is the col-
lective duty of  all peoples across the colonial divide and beyond to create, invent and 
chart a new course for a new and inclusive humanity. 
Edward said and secular Humanism
In one of  his readings of  the contemporary world realities, Edward W. Said 
(1935-2003), the Palestinian-born American scholar and critic, saw a world that was 
no longer under the unopposed thrall of  Eurocentrism and in which a panoply of  
literatures and civilisations that have emerged from the blight of  colonialism were 
challenging Western modes of  thought and epistemology. Instead of  musing on 
‘the clash of  civilisations’, he argued that it would certainly be better to expand our 
understanding of  human history to include all those ‘Others’ constructed as dehu-
manised, demonised opponents by imperial knowledges and a will to rule. As he put 
it, “civilisations have never occurred or survived for long simply by fighting off  all 
the others: beneath a superficial level of  defensive propaganda, every great civilisa-
tion is made up of  endless traffic with others (Said, 2000a: 291).
Said’s posthumously published book, Humanism and Democratic Criticism (2004), 
draws on the above insights to present a notion of  a secular humanism and cos-
mopolitanism that aims to bridge cultural fissures and ‘civilisational’ cleavages and 
to celebrate and emphasise interconnectedness and humanistic dialogue. Despite 
his methodological reliance on some thinkers associated with the poststructuralist 
school of  thought, a trend that is decidedly marked by its ‘anti-humanism’, Said 
retained a strong belief  in the ideals of  human freedom and human agency as the 
core of  any humanistic exercise. It is in this sense that he defines humanism as «dis-
closure, it is agency, it is immersing oneself  in the element of  history, it is recovering 
3  In the original French version, Fanon says literally, «if  faut faire peau neuve», which could be translated as «there is 
a need to make new skin». This interpretation implies, in my view, that people need to free themselves from the 
complexes and ideologies of  skins, as he explains en Peau noire, masques blancs, so that they can begin to perceive 
and see each other with only one human skin.
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rationality from the turbulent actualities of  human life, and then submitting them 
painstakingly to the rational processes of  judgment and criticism» (Said, 2000b). 
Aware of  the tremendous potential of  the complex Western hegemonic sys-
tems of  corporate knowledge to infuse institutions and discourses with ideology 
and purpose, he agreed with Raymond Williams (1958: 376) that these meta-level 
epistemologies and inherent dominative modes are not ontologically fixed and are 
therefore subject to reconfiguration, unlearning and dismantling. It is in this sense 
that he set out to challenge the ‘Western canon’ and its monopoly of  the category 
‘humanism’. While asserting that humanism is hardly a pure product of  the West, he 
argues that humanism cannot be truly humanist if  it does not account for human-
istic production outside the Western canon (Said, 2004). In making the case for his 
secular humanism, Said encourages intellectuals to tear open the canon to allow texts 
from multiple traditions, cultures, and locales to commune alongside the Western 
classics (Iskandar and Rustom, 2010: 11). 
Combining socio-political and intellectual history, philosophical reflection and 
ideology critique, Said’s various writings and his particularly ‘technique of  trouble’ 
(Iskandar and Rustom, 2010: 415) were above all intended to ‘dedomesticate’ criti-
cism and to turn its potentially corrosive power into a mechanism of  radical social 
change. At the heart of  his humanistic approach is his strong belief  in an opposi-
tional and secular humanism that is geared to furthering human (rational) enlighten-
ment and liberty. Emphasising his humanistic advocacy of  alternatives, he contends 
that «for intellectuals, artists, and free citizens, there must always be room for dis-
sent, for alternative views, for ways and possibilities to challenge the tyranny of  the 
majority and, at the same time and most importantly, to advance human enlighten-
ment and liberty» (Said and Barenboim, 2002: 181). For him, intellectuals therefore 
should represent a contrarian force in a world that has too often seen the unscrupu-
lous exercise of  power:
The intellectual . . . [represents] an individual vocation, an energy, a stubborn 
force engaging as a committed and recognisable voice in language and in so-
ciety with a whole slew of  issues, all of  them having to do in the end with a 
combination of  enlightenment and emancipation or freedom (Said, 1994: 73). 
Many of  Said’s works—especially Beginnings: Intention and Method; The World, the 
Text, and the Critic; and Humanism and Democratic Criticism, among others—demon-
strate his endeavour to reengage the enormous emancipatory potential of  a critical 
and secular humanism hat accounts for and reflects the interconnectedness of  the 
increasingly globalised world. At the same time, he also tries to expose and to scru-
tinize the abuses and the unacknowledged or deliberately suppressed barbaric and 
violent aspects of  ethnocentric humanism. Said’s aim was to open humanism up to 
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its own potential, to let hitherto ‘subjugated knowledges’ transform humanism in 
the name of  all humanity, and to decolonise humanism as a Eurocentric construct. 
Iskandar and Rustom (2010: 445) argue that Said’s rhetoric renders humanism ac-
countable to its Eurocentric past, and only when it accepts such accountability can 
humanism begin to measure up to the ‘human.’ In his reconstructive attempt to 
rethink humanism in the name of  its better half, he points out that:
I believed then, and still believe, that it is possible to be critical of  humanism 
in the name of  humanism and that, schooled in its abuses by the experience 
of  Eurocentrism and empire, one could fashion a different kind of  humanism 
that was cosmopolitan and text-and language bound in ways that absorbed 
the great lessons of  the past from, say, Eric Auerbach to Leo Spitzer and 
more recently from Richard Poirier, and still remain attuned to the emergent 
voices and currents of  the present, many of  them exilic, extraterritorial, and 
unhoused, as well as uniquely American (Said, 2004: 10-11).
This stance resembles Frantz Fanon’s call for a new humanism, as outlined above, 
which is based on the deconstruction not only of  the coloniser-colonised binary but 
also the colonialism system as such. In his description of  the cultural decolonising 
practices, Said also emphasises a ‘transnational humanism’ that should entail that 
pervasive and noticeable pull away from separatist nationalism toward a more inte-
grative view of  human community and human liberation. Despite the many post-
colonial critiques of  ‘universal humanism’ as a cloak for Eurocentrism that effaces 
cultural specificity, Said asserts that transnational secular humanism is crucial to «a 
more generous and pluralistic vision of  the world» (1993: 230).
His proposal of  secular humanism also breaks with essentialised notions of  ‘dif-
ference’ and builds on a philosophy of  critical cosmopolitanism (Mbembe and Po-
sel, 2005: 283-284). He understands difference in a way contrary to the common 
practice in which difference is employed to affirm identity, often with a tendency to-
ward domination or subjection. He clearly opposes the conceptualisation of  differ-
ences (identities or traditions) as pure or things that should be made ‘pure’. For him, 
an identity «is itself  made up of  different elements. But it has a coherent sound and 
personality or profile to it» (Said and Barenboim, 2002: 155). In this sense, a human-
ist community is one that overcomes divisions without destroying the differences.
Said’s emphasis on the need to «acknowledge the massively knotted and com-
plex histories of  special but nevertheless overlapping and interconnected experi-
ences» (Said, 1993: 32) led him to provide, in Orientalism, a compelling narrative 
of  European humanism’s complicity in the colonial project of  subjugating and 
misrepresenting the Orient, as explained above. This is based on his strong belief  
that the constitutive relation and complicity between cultural products and certain 
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political and historical practices, such as colonialism and imperialism, has to inter-
rogated with the utmost rigor and in utter accountability. Nevertheless, he stresses 
that such a critical project, by definition, has to be contrapuntal, in the sense that 
it has to acknowledge the potential for good and the harm done, and to try to 
transform that experience for the common good. Because he was self-consciously 
positioned within the Western culture and scholarship, Said was confident that he 
could read the Western culture against itself  and use its considerable resources 
selectively to interrogate its history and politics. In short, as Iskandar and Rustom 
(2010: 446) have argued, he set to himself  the important task of  «translating the 
West to itself, despite itself». In sum, Said’s proposal of  a secular humanism reads 
contrapuntally the historical experiences of  cultural encounter and exchange with 
an appreciation of  the increasing interconnectedness of  the world to reconstruct 
the humanistic and reconciliatory spirit inherent in those processes as a basis for 
enabling trans-cultural communication and understanding in the interest of  hu-
man freedom and enlightenment. 
Conclusions
Based on critical insights developed under the rubric of  Post-colonial Studies, 
the article has sought to reconsider critically some of  the underlying assumptions 
of  Western scientific and social knowledge along with the humanist ideas and values 
associated with it. The aim was to demonstrate the implication of  that knowledge in 
providing ideological basis for the violent and dehumanising practices and structures 
of  colonialism. It has been made clear that this critical exercise is inseparable from 
the attempt to restore the delegitimised and marginalised forms of  knowledge and 
to develop alternative modes of  knowledge, epistemologies and visions that could 
provide grounds for a genuinely inclusive and humanistic trans-cultural communica-
tion and understanding. It is in this context that a critical reconsideration of  human-
ism was introduced through the proposals made by Frantz Fanon and Edward Said. 
Although Fanon, as the rest of  his anti-colonial contemporaries, lived under 
colonial domination and his works were greatly informed by the characteristically 
binary and so often violent colonial confrontation, he never lost sight of  the need 
to overcome the colonial inhuman and disabling situation. His vision of  a new hu-
manism epitomises his fervent endeavour to go beyond the dehumanising colonial 
relations to envision more humanising modes of  cultural exchange and encounter 
and to create a new language and an inclusive notion of  humanity capable of  uniting 
all human energies to further the common struggle for human freedom. 
On the basis of  a critical appraisal and a contrapuntal reading of  the overlapping 
histories, geographies and the endless traffic between cultures in the contemporary 
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world as a result of  the colonial and other globalising experiences, Edward Said puts 
forth his vision of  a secular humanism, as an ethico-political worldly stance, which 
celebrates and emphasises interconnectedness and humanistic dialogue. The vision 
is also grounded on the strong belief  in the ability of  human agency and the po-
tential of  humanistic critical analysis to intervene and transform human and social 
realities. In sum, departing from different historical and cultural perspectives, both 
Fanon and Said tried to interrogate and decolonise humanism, which has often been 
appropriated ideologically, and to open it up to its own emancipatory potential and 
to other knowledges and experiences. Their aim was, thus, to envisage an alternative 
notion of  humanism that is geared to furthering human enlightenment and liberty 
and enabling an inclusive and humanistic trans-cultural communication and under-
standing in an increasingly interrelated world. 
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